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ABSTRACT

Changes in political preferences and personal goals of a national sample of college students and University of California-Berkeley (Berkeley) undergraduates of the 1960s and the 1980s were compared, using the university's freshmen survey and the Cooperative Institutional Research Program's nationwide survey of freshmen. Specific attention was focused on relationships in political preference, life goals, and fields of study for 1973 and 1984 Berkeley freshmen. Findings include: (1) both nationally and at Berkeley, significantly fewer freshmen identified themselves as "liberal" (or "far left") than a decade ago, but the proportion of Berkeley freshmen saying there were liberal remained much higher than the national norm; (2) the sharpest increase in conservatives at Berkeley was among white males, and in 1984 their proportion was higher than the national norm; (3) both male and female Berkeley students were more career-oriented than two decades ago and were more likely to choose "vocational" fields of study such as business administration and engineering; (4) regardless of political orientation or major field, more 1984 freshmen believed it was important to be well off financially; and (5) in 1984 raising a family was seen as more important than 10 years ago, especially by men. (SW)

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Berkeley Students from 1964 to 1984: What Are the Differences and What Difference Does It Make?

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CONTENTS

Abstract. iii

United States College Students. 5

Berkeley Students 11

Berkeley Freshmen in 1973 and in 1984 17

Conclusion. 36

References. 37

TABLES

Table 1. University of California, Berkeley, Students in the 1960s and in the 1980s. 12

Table 2. Berkeley Freshmen Political Preferences by Race and Gender in 1973 and in 1984 (%). 19

Table 3. Importance of Twelve Personal Goals for Non-Minority Female and Male Berkeley Freshmen in 1973 and in 1984 . . . 22

Table 4. Intended Areas of Major and Relationship to Importance of Being Well-Off Financially and Political Preference for Berkeley Non-Minority Freshmen in 1973 and in 1984. . . 24

Table 5. Relationship between Selected Personal Goals and Political Preferences for Non-Minority Female and Male Berkeley Freshmen in 1973 and in 1984 28

Table 6. Relationship between Selected Current Views and Political Preferences for Non-Minority Female and Male Berkeley Freshmen in 1973 and in 1984 31

Table 7. 1984 Berkeley Non-Minority Freshmen Strongly Agreeing that Government is Not Promoting Disarmament Sufficiently (by Political Preference). 33

FIGURES

Figure 1. Trends in Freshman Political Preferences, 1969-1984: National Data. 8

Figure 2. Trends in Freshman Political Preferences, 1971-1984: UC Berkeley Data 8

Figure 3. Trends in Student Objectives, 1967-1984: National Data. 10

Figure 4. Trends in Student Objectives, 1967-1984: UC Berkeley Data 10

BERKELEY STUDENTS FROM 1964 TO 1984:
WHAT ARE THE DIFFERENCES AND WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE?

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Abstract

The twentieth anniversary of Berkeley's Free Speech Movement and media reports of rampant student conservatism prompted us to compare current University of California-Berkeley undergraduates with those of the 1960s and early 1970s. Our major data are from the annual nationwide survey of freshmen administered by UCLA's Cooperative Institutional Research Program. We also use data collected by Berkeley's Office of Student Research and Office of Institutional Research.

We have compared the trends in political preferences and personal goals of Berkeley freshmen since the sixties with the national sample of freshmen for the same period. We looked for other changes among Berkeley undergraduates over the twenty years, examining the data by gender and ethnicity. Finally, we analyzed in more detail relationships among changes in political preference, life goals, and fields of study for 1973 and 1984 Berkeley freshmen. We explored in particular the meaning of "conservative" and "liberal" in the context of societal changes over the last two decades.

Though our approach is exploratory and our findings are only suggestive, we found that:

1. Both nationally and at Berkeley, significantly fewer freshmen identify themselves as "liberal" (or "far left") than a decade ago. At Berkeley this decline appears fairly uniform across gender and ethnicity. But the proportion of Berkeley freshmen who identify as "liberal" remains much higher than the national norm.
2. Political orientation of Berkeley freshmen varies by ethnicity and gender. A clear majority of Asian freshmen in 1984 report themselves as "middle-of-the-road." Other minority freshmen and white female freshmen are roughly split between "middle-of-the-road"

and "liberal." A significantly smaller number are "conservative." The sharpest increase in conservatives at Berkeley has been among white males, and in 1984 their proportion was higher than the national norm.

3. Nationally, there has been a sharp decline in the proportion of freshmen who say it is important to develop a meaningful philosophy of life and a sharp increase in those who say it is important to be very well-off financially. Among Berkeley freshmen, the trends are the same, but here the importance of developing a philosophy of life has declined much less and is considerably higher than the national norm.
4. Berkeley students, both male and female, are more "career-oriented" than two decades ago and are more likely to choose "vocational" fields of study such as business administration and engineering. Changes over the past decade have been especially dramatic for women. At the same time, raising a family is now seen as more important than ten years ago, especially by men.
5. For Berkeley freshmen, political orientation, major field, and importance of being very well-off financially are moderately intercorrelated both in 1973 and in 1984. But changes in the three items over the decade appear to be relatively independent. For example, regardless of political orientation or major field, more 1984 freshmen think it important to be very well-off financially. Similarly, even controlling for political orientation, 1984 freshmen appear to take more conservative positions on social issues associated with equity and governmental intervention.
6. We conclude that Berkeley freshmen generally remain more liberal than some of the media accounts would lead us to believe, but--among white males at least--there is evidence of a more conservative presence than a decade ago. This also suggests that, although a general convergence of gender roles is associated with the greater career-orientation of women, there is the possibility of a growing "gender gap" at the more conservative end of the political spectrum.

Our results highlight the need for policy makers as well as institutional researchers to avoid facile generalizations about the presumably homogeneous category "college student." We stress instead the importance of more differentiated studies that distinguish among subgroups and levels of analysis.

BERKELEY STUDENTS FROM 1964 TO 1984:

WHAT ARE THE DIFFERENCES AND WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE?

Staff of the Office of Student Research at the University of California, Berkeley (UC Berkeley), decided to examine data on students of the 1960s (60s) and students of the 1980s (80s) because of our concern over media reports that we thought exaggerated and even distorted differences between the two student generations. The local event that stimulated much of the publicity about the 60s generation was the 20th anniversary last September of UC Berkeley's Free Speech Movement (FSM). Then, in January, when the results of the annual freshman survey conducted by the Cooperative Institutional Research Program (CIRP) were reported, there were more headlines about how different today's students are from their counterparts in the 60s.

These are some examples of media headlines and other statements which provoked us to look into the reported changes in student attitudes and values:

> Leftists, professors and College Republicans disagree over whether campus is moving to right, moving away from politics, or waiting for an issue. (Chronicle of Higher Education, 9/26/84)
>
> Berkeley--that hotbed of, well, conservatism... (Washington Post, quoted in Chronicle of Higher Education, 9/26/84)
>
> The new freshmen this year at UC-Berkeley are practical, idealistic, liberal, conservative and awfully smart. (UC Berkeley, Public Information Office, 1/10/85)
>
> 1984-85 freshmen are more interested in making money than any other class in the history of the survey. (UCLA News, 1/14/85)

During the week-long FSM anniversary program on the Berkeley campus last September, several FSM leaders and some current student leaders suggested that student activism was alive and well, though lacking a unifying issue. Some faculty were quoted describing students as apathetic or "pre-political";

some suggested that students do, in fact, have social concerns, and would mobilize quickly around a major issue such as United States intervention in Central America.

We did not know when we planned this paper that we would be completing it in the midst of another large student movement, the anti-apartheid protest that seeks to have the University divest itself of investments in South Africa.

Beginning on April 11 of this year, hundreds of students (and others) have been sitting-in and sleeping-in on the steps of Sproul Hall, the scene of the original FSM sit-in. Then, Sproul Hall was the site of the Chancellor's Office; now it houses only some student service and administrative units. On April 17, 158 of the people sitting-in were arrested for violation of campus regulations. (The FSM sit-in of December 2, 1964, led to 761 arrests.)

But this student protest is not the only contemporary example of student activism. There was considerable campus activity during the 1984 national presidential election. Then, Berkeley's student body elections had the highest turnout of voters in over 15 years. The newly-elected student body president, an ethnic minority and the first graduate student elected to that post since 1968, is a leader in the South Africa protest. The Association of Graduate Student Employees has recently won recognition as a bargaining agent for graduate student employees who are readers and tutors. There have been other student demonstrations in recent years about campus issues as well as foreign policy concerns, e.g., student fee increases, financial aid cuts, the invasion of Grenada, and intervention in Central America. And, in 1976, there were student demonstrations over South Africa. The tables in Sproul Plaza, an issue that precipitated the FSM, continue to represent the full political, ethnic, and social diversity of the Berkeley students.

But student activism, as we all know, did not originate in Berkeley during the 60s. Just to provide some perspective, here are two brief items on Berkeley students in the 1930s:

> March, 1935, Berkeley--Nine University of California students, four of them women, were arrested for distributing anti-war handbills outside the Sather Gate entrance of the institution today. (Oakland Tribune, 3/20/35)

"Berkeley Student Life in the '30s: An Era of Activism." In an article in the November 22, 1983, campus newspaper, The Daily Californian, a history instructor wrote about the student movement in the 1930s:

> Most dramatic of all the political actions on the Berkeley campus during the 1930s were the annual demonstrations held in conjunction with the national student movement to protest war and fascism. At their peak, these demonstrations...drew crowds of over 4,000 students who packed the Sather Gate area to hear liberal, Christian pacifist, socialist and communist speakers...

Using the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the FSM (which also coincided with George Orwell's prophetic 1984), we have analyzed three levels of data. First, we looked at 20 years of national data on student attitudes, then at similar data for Berkeley students, and finally we have made a detailed analysis of Berkeley freshmen of 1973 compared with the 1984 class.

In discussing these two college generations, we want to clarify the time periods under review. We are actually referring to almost-contiguous periods that run from the mid-60s to the mid-80s. The "60s" period we discuss here covers about 1964 to 1975, and the "80s" from 1978 to 1985.

While 1984 was the 20th anniversary of the FSM at Berkeley, 1985 is the 10th anniversary of the end of the Vietnam War. So the FSM and Vietnam define the outer limits of the 60s. The era is also characterized by the civil rights movement and the Kennedy and King assassinations.

The 80s are perhaps not so well defined, but probably had their genesis in 1973 with Watergate and the start of a declining economy. By 1980, the freshman surveys showed a jump in the proportion of students concerned with being "very well-off financially" and a decline in "keeping up to date with political affairs" (Levy and Michel, 1985; Astin, 1982).

The next section deals with reported changes among college students at the national level.

United States College Students

Students of the 60s have been described as idealistic, socially-conscious and future-oriented (Sanford, 1967; Katz, 1969; Levine, 1980).

Students of the 80s are said to be pragmatic, vocationally-oriented, materialistic, narcissistic and pessimistic (Levine, 1980; Astin, 1982). Levine (1980) describes their views of the future as "going first class on the Titanic" and supports this characterization with an excerpt (p. 103) from a 1978 Carnegie Council student survey:

> Interviewer: Will the United States be a better or worse place to live in the next ten years?
>
> Student: The U.S. will definitely be a worse place to live.
>
> Interviewer: Then you must be pessimistic about the future.
>
> Student: No, I'm optimistic.
>
> Interviewer (with surprise): Why?
>
> Student: Because I have a high grade point average and I'm going to get a good job, make a lot of money, and live in a nice house.

There are some new elements in this college generation. They have the vote. They are less homogeneous--for the first time ever, more women than men are in college, and there is a much greater ethnic mix; in this sense they are less unified. Yet descriptions of this generation frequently describe college students in homogeneous terms. It's as though then they were idealistic; now they're materialistic. But the substantive differences are overlooked.

Others have already commented on this oversimplification of differences between the two generations. Levy and Michel (1985) have demonstrated how the "idealism" of the 60s was rooted in the financial security and good economic prospects of the time. Then, in Fall 1973, as the economy was "going sour," the proportion of male freshmen marking "being well-off" as a major goal jumped

from 50% to 62%. Rising housing costs and a shrinking labor market had made students more pessimistic and more concerned with financial security.

The economist Robert Samuelson, in a recent Newsweek editorial (1985, p. 63), critiqued an earlier article in the same magazine that characterized young professionals as "greedy, self-centered" and countered that:

> high inflation, oil-price increases and periodic recessions... made the humdrum ambitions of getting a good job and making money seem more imperative.... This does not mean that everyone today is an economic hedonist anymore than it meant in the 1960s that everyone was a flower child.

Levine and Wilson (1979) point out that student activism is not dead but transformed. Carnegie Council surveys of postsecondary institutions showed that, although the types of student activism most frequent in the 60s (large-scale demonstrations, threats of violence, building takeovers, and property destruction) were rare in 1977-78, the category of "other protest activities" increased markedly. Twenty-eight percent of the institutions surveyed (870) reported the occurrence of "other" protests in 1977-78, but only 4% had reported this category for 1969-70. "Other" turns out to include Public Interest Research Groups (PIRGs), in existence only since 1970, and student lobbies, which have more than doubled in number since 1970. Another category of protests, student-initiated lawsuits, was reported to have increased between 1969 and 1978 by one-third of the institutions.

Student participation in high school demonstrations, as reported in the CIRP surveys, has also been on the increase (Astin, 1982).

The Freshman Survey/National Sample

The primary data base for the 20-year comparison is the national freshman survey, which has been in use since 1966. We refer, of course, to the Cooperative Institutional Research Program's annual survey of freshmen administered by UCLA's

Higher Education Research Institute and the American Council on Education. The 1984 national sample consisted of 271,685 entering freshmen at 526 colleges and universities. The national norms are based on 182,370 questionnaires from 345 institutions, an 11% sample of the 1.64 million freshmen. The questionnaire contains 150 items on student background, socioeconomic characteristics, interests and goals, activities, and attitudes. Two particular areas of change between these generations have been highlighted by the CIRP surveys: (a) political preferences and (b) personal goals.

Political Preferences/National Sample

In the CIRP survey, students are asked, "How would you characterize your political views?" The choices are "far left," "liberal," "middle-of-the-road," "conservative," and "far right." While the long-term trend has been toward the political center, there are slight counter-trends in recent years. Figure 1 groups "far left" with "liberal" and "far right" with "conservative," masking the facts that the left is relatively unchanged (around 2%) and the far right, less than 1% before 1978, has stabilized at about 1%. "Liberal/left" has gained a little each year from its low of 19.7% in 1981. Since 1981, the "conservative" portion has been relatively stable at about 20%. At the same time, students continue to endorse a variety of traditionally liberal stands: "government is not doing enough to control pollution"; "national health care plan is needed"; "government should do more to promote nuclear disarmament."

Personal Goals/National Sample

The most ballyhooed trend in the national survey results is one showing that the goal of "developing a meaningful philosophy of life" has declined in importance, while "being very well-off financially" has increased correspondingly among freshmen. In the 60s, 82% of the national sample chose the philosophy

FIGURE 1. **Trends in Freshman Political Preferences,** 1969-1984

NATIONAL DATA



Source: Astin, Alexander W., et al. The American Freshman National Norms for Fall 1984. Cooperative Institutional Research Program, Higher Education Research Institute, University of California, Los Angeles, 1984.

FIGURE 2. **Trends in Freshman Political Preferences,** 1971-1984

UC BERKELEY DATA



Note: Data were not collected at Berkeley in 1969 and 1970.

Source: Cooperative Institutional Research Program, Summary of Data on Entering Freshman for Fall, 1971-1984: UC Berkeley.

of life issue as "essential" or "very important", whereas only 45% chose "being very well-off" (Figure 3). Since about 1970, these two goals have gradually changed places, and now it is "being very well-off" that is chosen by a majority of 71%, while only 48% choose "philosophy of life".

Speculation is rampant over the meaning of this change. Levine (1980, pp. 112-113) suggests that "philosophy of life" is simply less salient now because of the feeling of doom that pervades students and society. He asks, "Why rearrange the chairs on the deck of the Titanic?" Astin (1984), on the other hand, asks whether students view the making of money as a kind of philosophy of life in itself.

Our effort in this inquiry is not to explain the changes and trends over the past 20 years among college freshmen. Rather, it is to analyze available data to ferret out what seem to us the more substantive changes and to discuss the collection, uses, and implications of these trend data from the institutional researcher's viewpoint.

Next, we look at Berkeley students over the past two decades, using both enrollment statistics and survey results. We also compare the Berkeley sample with the national sample on the "political preference" and "personal goals" trends.

FIGURE 3. **Trends in Student Objectives, 1967-1984**
NATIONAL DATA



Source: Astin, Alexander W., et al. The American Freshman National Norms for Fall 1984. Cooperative Institutional Research Program, Higher Education Research Institute, University of California, Los Angeles, 1984.

FIGURE 4. **Trends in Student Objectives, 1967-1984**
UC BERKELEY DATA



Note: Data were not collected at Berkeley in 1969 and 1970.

Source: Cooperative Institutional Research Program, Summary of Data on Entering Freshmen for Fall, 1967-68, 1971-84: UC Berkeley.

Berkeley Students

For our purposes we had access to longitudinal data on Berkeley student characteristics maintained by our office (a separate unit in Undergraduate Affairs) as well as the Office of Institutional Research. A particularly rich source of information is over 15 years of CIRP survey data, plus computer tapes of results by gender and ethnicity from 1973. The freshman survey has been administered at Berkeley since 1966, except for 1969 and 1970. Fifty percent of incoming freshmen are surveyed. Data for 1984 are derived from 1,261 questionnaires out of a freshman class of 4,283, a 29% sample. Half of the freshmen were mailed questionnaires; 57% of the sample completed them.

In this paper we compare Berkeley results with the national norms. We should note, however, that the national sample is also stratified into 37 different groupings of institutional types (by level, control, predominantly black or white and "selectivity"). UC Berkeley, for example, is grouped with the "highly selective" public universities. The summary of data that CIRP prepares for this campus has included, since 1980, summary results for the high selectivity sample. However, we have not used these results for comparison in this paper because longitudinal data are lacking and the differences from the overall norms are small.

Table 1 provides campus enrollment data for the mid-60s and Fall 1984. The number of undergraduates has increased by about one-third, for a current total of almost 22,000. There are slightly more lower division than upper division students now, while lower division students were only 40% of the 1965 undergraduates. Graduate student enrollment is down 11%. Overall, today's campus has a larger proportion of younger students.

Table 1. University of California, Berkeley, Students in the 1960s and in the 1980s

	1960s		1980s		Percent Change
	#	%	#	%	
Total Enrollments (1965 and 1984)	26,834		31,008		16%
Undergraduates	16,610	62%	21,907	71%	32%
Graduates	10,224	38%	9,101	29%	-11%
Undergraduate Characteristics					
Male	9,837	59%	11,848	54%	20%
Female	6,773	41%	10,059	46%	49%
Lower Division	6,658	40%	11,392	52%	71%
Upper Division	9,952	60%	10,515	48%	6%
Ethnicity (1970 and 1984)					
White*	13,976	77%	13,132	62%	-6%
All Others	4,286	23%	8,775	38%	105%
Asian	2,227	13%	5,126	23%	130%
Black	709	4%	1,040	5%	47%
Hispanic	405	2%	1,332	6%	229%
Selected Majors** (1965 and 1984)					
Social Sciences	3,331	30%	2,052	20%	-38%
Humanities and Arts	1,795	16%	1,232	11%	-31%
Engineering	1,628	15%	2,297	22%	41%
Physical Sciences	1,099	10%	1,533	7%	39%
Environmental Design	966	9%	638	6%	-34%
Biosciences	687	6%	636	7%	-7%
Business Administration	555	5%	559	5%	0.7%

*Individuals who checked "decline to state" are included in this category. In 1970, they totaled 18% of undergraduates, while in 1984 they totaled only 0.9%.

**The proportion of students in these majors is based on the number of declared majors: 11,074 in 1965 and 11,907 in 1984. Even though undergraduate enrollment has increased by one-third, the increase is primarily in the lower division, where most of the students have not yet declared majors.

Sources: University of California Statistical Summary: Fall Term 1965; UC Berkeley Office of Institutional Research, Campus Statistics, 1970, and Ethnic Assign Report, Fall 1984; UC Berkeley Office of Student Research, Undergraduate Statistics for the University of California, Berkeley, Fall 1984 (October 26, 1984).

Among the undergraduates, there continue to be more men than women, but the gap has narrowed to 8 percentage points. In 1970, men outnumbered women by 18 percentage points.

The ethnic distribution of our undergraduates has become much more diverse. Since 1970, enrollment of Asians has increased over 100% and Hispanics over 200%. One-fourth of undergraduates are Asian, almost double their share in 1965. Thirty-eight percent of undergraduates are members of minority groups now, compared to 23% in 1970.

Berkeley is on San Francisco Bay, a major Pacific port, and many Southeast Asian immigrants and refugees have settled here in the past decade. The campus has about 2,000 immigrant and refugee students, double their number ten years ago. The Southeast Asian refugee population of California was recently estimated at close to 300,000 (Wall Street Journal, 3/27/85). Although only 7% of the State's high school graduates are Asian, their college-going rate is about double that of white graduates. Thus, this growing population group has an impact on higher education in California disproportionate to its size.

Political Preferences/Berkeley

In Figure 2, we see that Berkeley students' political preferences have shifted since 1971, but not as much as the national sample's. (1971, incidentally, was the year that 18-year-olds first got the vote.) The proportion of "far left" and "liberal" has declined; "middle-of-the-road" and "conservative" have gained. However, "middle-of-the-road" has dropped a little each of the last two years and "liberal" has gained a little, so this may be the beginning of a new trend--or it may just be another blip.

But could "middle-of-the-road" and "liberal" have different meanings now than then? One of the FSM leaders, interviewed in the campus daily last September, suggested that our society as a whole is less "conservative" now

than it was in the 60s (Daily Californian, 10/2/84, p. 4). Thus, it may be that support for abortion, sex outside of marriage, political tables on Sproul Plaza (the precipitating issue in the FSM), and a well-established Ethnic Studies department (a cause of student demonstrations in the 1970s) may now be taken for granted and perhaps considered "middle-of-the-road", when then they were "liberal".

Now, comparing national trends (Figure 1) with Berkeley trends (Figure 2), we find that the conservative/far right categories have increased at a faster rate at Berkeley and are now almost parallel to the national proportion. However, the liberal/left categories have declined less steeply at Berkeley than at the national level, and the 25-point difference that existed in 1970 has lessened by only 6 points. The gap between the percent of Berkeley students selecting "middle-of-the-road" and "liberal/left" is less than 5 points, but almost 40 points in the national sample.

Personal Goals/Berkeley

We have seen that the national trend has been toward the increasing importance of "well-offism" and a decline in the importance of a "philosophy of life" (Figure 3). At Berkeley, a similar but not so marked change has occurred (Figure 4). Here, "philosophy" and "well-off" were farther apart in the 60s than nationally, and in 1984 the two items were chosen by almost the same proportion of students. In 1971, only 30% of Berkeley respondents said being very well-off was very important or essential, while 78% responded to "philosophy." In 1984, being well-off was chosen by 69%, and "philosophy" by 64%. So Berkeley students, at least, have not given up the importance of developing a philosophy of life for "well-offism."

Berkeley Students/Other Changes

What are some clear-cut differences in our students over the past 20 years? We've already noted that women undergraduates have come close to parity with men; and that ethnic diversity has been increasing, with the proportion of non-whites doubling over the last 14 years.

What else do we know about changes in Berkeley students? With regard to majors, they have followed the national trend toward more majors in business and engineering and fewer in humanities and social sciences. But straight comparisons between the decades do not tell the whole story. Since 1965, 42 new majors have been added to the curriculum at Berkeley, including conservation and resource studies, nuclear engineering, computer science, Afro-American studies, film, dance, and neurobiology.

The proportion of Berkeley students majoring in engineering (especially in the electrical engineering-computer science major) has almost doubled, but the number and proportion in business administration is much the same as 20 years ago. Does that mean Berkeley students are not as business-oriented as students are nationally? It does not. In fact, business administration is one of the most "impacted" majors on the campus. There are about three times as many eligible applicants as there are places, but the undergraduate division on the campus has not been able to expand any further.

Majors that have declined are primarily in the humanities and social sciences. Again, the numbers do not tell the story. Psychology, for example, is almost half the size it was in the 60s, but is now an impacted major. History majors, on the other hand, are only one-third as many as 20 years ago, and both sociology and anthropology have declined by one-half. In these cases, the numbers do reflect the lack of recent demand, which, however, seems to be turning around a little. For the past two years, social sciences majors are

increasing, and in Fall 1985, there are more prospective history majors than can be accommodated.

The most dramatic changes are, of course, for women. At Berkeley, the proportion of women has increased from 11% to 49% in business administration; from 11% to 47% in chemistry (including chemical engineering); from 1% to 21% in engineering (including computer science), and from 17% to 38% in environmental design. In some other traditionally male areas, there is little change, e.g., the proportion of women in mathematics has grown only from 30% to 37%. While women still comprise only 21% of engineering students, they represent the largest number (493) in a previously "male" field, Berkeley's college of engineering having almost doubled since 1967, from 1,394 to 2,390 students.

Berkeley Freshmen in 1973 and in 1984

We now turn to a more detailed comparison of freshman political and social characteristics in 1973 and 1984. We chose 1973 because it is the earliest year for which a computer tape was available for analysis. An earlier year probably would have been preferable for the 60s-80s contrast. For example, as already noted, in 1973 there was a marked increase in the rated importance of being very well-off financially. Nonetheless, this year should still capture much of the socialization effects of the 60s and provide an interesting contrast to the freshman class of 1984.

In 1973 the questionnaire was mailed to the entire freshman class of 4,445 and 1,862 students returned it, a response rate of 42%. The 1984 data are derived from a mailing to one-half of the incoming Asian and white and all the Affirmative Action (non-Asian minority) incoming freshmen. The 1,261 completed questionnaires represent 57% of the sample. Because we are examining only two years of data and, in the case of the 1984 class, the actual numbers used in our analysis are relatively small, the results we present here should be treated as tentative and suggestive only. In subsequent work, we plan to use additional years and pool data for subgroups across years for more substantial analyses.

In this analysis we will focus on the question of whether or not Berkeley freshmen are really substantially more conservative in 1984 than in 1973 (and, by implication, perhaps, the 60s). We will examine self-expressed political orientation, personal goals, choice of major, and views on current issues.

Political Preferences/Berkeley: Gender and Ethnic Differences

As noted, the proportion of women and ethnic minorities has increased significantly from the 60s to the 80s. How has this affected the political orientation of the Berkeley freshman class? There are several possibilities. First, some have suggested that as Berkeley becomes more ethnically diverse, it should also become more politically diverse and, indeed, perhaps even polarized between the new white conservatism and the traditional liberalism of ethnic minorities. Others have suggested that, to the contrary, the ethnic minority students attracted to Berkeley tend to be, if not conservative, at least pragmatic and interested in pursuing careers in traditionally non-activist fields such as engineering and business. In either case, it is also possible that the same trends toward conservative political self-identification that are said to characterize majority students apply to minority students as well.

Table 2 contrasts the political preferences of Berkeley freshmen in 1973 and 1984 dividing the students into ethnic and gender subgroups. This analysis has several interesting aspects:

a. There is a consistent decline in the percentage of students who identify themselves as "liberal" and "far left" across all ethnic and gender categories.

b. Asians, which, it will be recalled, make up two-thirds of the minority students at Berkeley, are seen here as somewhat less likely to identify themselves as "liberal" and a great deal more likely to choose "middle-of-the-road" than either white or other minority students. A clear majority of all Asian students appear to now fall into this single category, "middle-of-the-road."

c. About twice as many Berkeley freshmen women identify themselves as "conservative" in 1984 as in 1973. Minority men are also

Table 2. Berkeley Freshmen Political Preferences by Race and Gender in 1973 and in 1984 (%)

1973	White		Asian		Other Minority		Total	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Far Right	0.2	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.8
Conservative	7.7	10.6	7.4	12.5	4.3	7.0	7.5	10.7
Middle-of-the-Road	34.4	31.5	57.0	41.9	29.8	23.3	37.8	32.5
Liberal	52.9	48.9	34.1	43.1	59.6	62.8	50.1	48.8
Far Left	4.9	8.1	1.5	2.5	6.4	7.0	4.4	7.6
(Number)	(556)	(839)	(135)	(160)	(47)	(43)	(756)	(1061)
1984								
Far Right	1.4	1.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	1.3	0.7	0.9
Conservative	15.7	29.5	14.1	17.9	13.7	7.6	14.5	24.2
Middle-of-the-Road	40.8	29.5	61.5	53.8	38.5	48.1	45.7	37.9
Liberal	39.9	36.7	24.4	27.6	47.9	39.2	37.9	34.4
Far Left	2.3	3.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.8	1.2	2.6
(Number)	(306)	(387)	(135)	(156)	(117)	(79)	(593)	(649)

Source: Cooperative Institutional Research Program, Summary of Data on Entering Freshmen for Fall, 1973 and 1984: UC Berkeley.

slightly more likely to choose "conservative." However, white males offer the most significant contrast over time. Almost tripling their proportion since 1973, 29.5% of this group now identify themselves as "conservative." Among white students, then, there is an interesting gender contrast. For both men and women, the plurality of white Berkeley freshmen see themselves as "liberal" or "far left," but, based on our sample, there are twice as many "conservatives" among white male freshmen than among white female freshmen.

d. Despite the move toward conservatism and the virtual disappearance of "far left" identification among Berkeley freshmen, there is remarkably little evidence of a "far right" identification. In the entire sample of 1,261 freshmen, only 10 individuals, or less than 1%, chose this option!

In summary, our data suggest a fairly uniform decline in liberal/left categories across gender and ethnicity (though, as noted, much less steeply than in the national sample); an increase in "middle-of-the-road" that is largely attributable to a growing Asian presence; and an increase in the conservative (but not "far right") category that has occurred disproportionately among white males. At the same time, compared to the national norms, there are both higher proportions of Berkeley white male freshmen who identify themselves as conservatives and who identify themselves as liberals.

The patterns of political preferences among white students, rather than any contrast between whites and the growing ethnic minority presence, it seems to us, make the more interesting story here. Further preliminary analyses suggested

ethnic differences were not that striking, and so the remainder of the paper will focus on understanding the differences between 1973 and 1984 non-minority freshmen, especially differences by gender.

Personal Goals/Berkeley: Gender Differences

In Table 3 the contrast between 1973 and 1984 freshmen in self-ascribed importance of the widely discussed goals of "developing a meaningful philosophy of life" and "being very well-off financially" is presented. Ten other items on goals in the 1973 survey that are repeated in the 1984 version are also compared.

As we have seen, the percentage endorsing the importance of the philosophy of life goal has declined, and the percentage endorsing the importance of the financial well-being goal has increased. Note that there also have been significant increases in the rated importance of being an authority in one's field, having administrative responsibility for the work of others, and raising a family. Thus, it appears as if Berkeley non-minority freshmen in 1984 rate both career and family orientation as more important than they did in 1973.

These results contrast with those obtained by Regan and Roland (1982) in their study of University of California, Davis, seniors of 1970 and 1980. Asking about life satisfactions, they found an increase over the 10 years in career orientation and a decrease in family orientation for women, with a decrease in career orientation but no corresponding decrease in family orientation for men. Our data, several years later (freshmen in 1973 and 1984), suggest increases in both domains for both sexes with women having a sharper increase in career orientation and men a sharper increase in family orientation. Note that, in 1984, a somewhat higher percentage of men (68%) than women (64%) rated raising a family as important!

Table 3. Importance of Twelve Personal Goals for Non-Minority Female and Male Berkeley Freshmen in 1973 and in 1984

Personal Importance of:	% Indicating "Very Important" or "Essential"									
	Women					Men				
	1973		1984			1973		1984		
	%	Rank	%	Rank	Change	%	Rank	%	Rank	Change
Developing a meaningful philosophy of life	85	1	65	3	-20	77	1	62	5	-15
Helping others who are in difficulty	68	2	64	5	-4	55	4	49	6	-6
Keeping up-to-date with political affairs	64	3	68	2	+4	59	3	72	2	+13
Being an authority in one's field	60	4	82	1	+22	64	2	79	1	+15
Raising a family	45	5	64	4	+19	44	6	68	4	+24
Becoming involved in clean up of environment	41	6	26	11	-15	35	8	25	11	-10
Influencing social values	37	7	34	9	-3	30	9	26	10	-4
Becoming accomplished in one of the performing arts	37	8	12	12	-25	26	10	15	12	-11
Being very well off financially	34	9	58	6	+24	48	5	72	3	+24
Being successful in business of one's own	24	10	38	7	+14	36	7	48	7	+12
Influencing the political structure	21	11	27	10	+6	26	11	26	9	0
Having administrative responsibility for others	11	12	38	8	+27	19	12	35	8	+16
(Average Number of Respondents*)	(562)		(304)			(840)		(385)		

*Number of respondents varies very slightly from item to item.

Source: Cooperative Institutional Research Program, Summary of Data on Entering Freshmen for Fall, 1973 and 1984: UC Berkeley.

Two other items are especially worth noting. Only a third as many freshmen women in 1984 as in 1973 chose accomplishment in a performing art as an important goal. This change, accompanied by the increased importance of career-related goals (Table 3), is another confirmation of major changes taking place in women's goals over the 10-year period. Secondly, the importance of keeping up with political affairs has increased, significantly so for men, apparently contradicting the notion that Berkeley students are more apolitical than a decade ago. The implications of the differences between rating of importance of goals in 1973 and in 1984 will be examined in greater detail later, especially in relation to political orientation.

Intended Majors, Political Preference, and Personal Goals

As has been noted, there has been a shift both nationally and at Berkeley over the past couple of decades away from liberal arts and to "practical" majors such as business and engineering. The change has been especially dramatic for women. The left-hand portion of Table 4 illustrates this shift in terms of the intended area of major for Berkeley non-minority freshmen in 1973 and 1984. Note in particular the increase in the percentage of women intending to major in business and engineering and the sharp decrease in the percentage planning a major in the humanities. (A parallel decrease in various social science majors is obscured because of the increase, especially among women, in political science majors, often in anticipation of law school.)

In media accounts of changes in choice of major, values, goals, and political identification have all been cited as evidence for the shift to (or, more appropriately, toward) conservatism at Berkeley. Unexamined, however, is the extent to which these three changes are actually associated with one another. For example, does the increased proportion of students in business and

Table 4. Intended Areas of Major and Relationship to Importance of Being Well-Off Financially and Political Preference for Berkeley Non-Minority Freshmen in 1973 and in 1984

	% Intending to Major in Given Area				% of Those within Area Indicating Being Very Well-Off Financially "Very Important" or "Essential"				% of Those within Area Identifying Self as "Liberal" or "Far Left"			
	Female		Male		Female		Male		Female		Male	
	1973	1984	1973	1984	1973	1984	1973	1984	1973	1984	1973	1984
Biological Sciences	10.3	14.6	11.4	12.5	26	46	46	67	73	51	55	32
Business	2.4	10.0	7.4	18.1	66	90	74	89	14	19	36	24
Education	5.9	1.6	1.4	0.0	27	40	50	--	39	0	50	--
Engineering	1.4	8.7	12.4	16.5	63	53	65	69	25	33	40	29
Humanities	26.6	13.3	11.8	8.9	34	37	36	40	60	56	73	68
Physical Sciences	5.0	4.2	12.5	10.2	46	69	39	67	48	62	54	33
Professional	13.3	10.7	13.2	6.4	32	73	49	74	46	24	56	38
Social Sciences	21.1	20.1	14.7	11.5	29	59	45	64	70	49	76	56
Computer Science	0.2	0.6	1.4	5.9	100	100	25	96	100	50	58	48
Other	5.1	6.8	6.8	3.3	48	26	37	92	42	60	49	69
Undecided	8.7	9.4	7.1	6.9	33	59	45	59	67	32	62	52
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	34	58	48	72	57	42	57	41
(Number)	(556)	(306)	(839)	(387)								

Note: Especially striking changes are underlined. Several intended areas of major have so few students that individual comparisons are not meaningful.

Source: Cooperative Institutional Research Program, Summary of Data on Entering Freshmen for Fall, 1973 and 1984: UC Berkeley.

engineering entirely account for the increased proportion of students who ascribe importance to being very well-off financially? (Or, conversely, does the increased proportion of students interested in being very well-off financially account entirely for the increased proportion of students in business and engineering? Causality is not being examined here, only the statistical associations.)

The remainder of Table 4 begins to explore the relationship among major, financial goal, and political identification. The middle of the table illustrates, for example, that students intending to major in business stress the importance of being very well-off financially and those who are planning to go into the humanities do not. But the table also shows that there has been a general shift regardless of major to a greater expressed importance of being very well-off financially. Therefore, only a portion of the increase in the importance Berkeley freshmen assign to this goal can be attributed directly to the shift in popularity of majors. Interestingly, none of the increase in importance assigned to financial well-being can be attributed to the increased proportion of students in engineering.

The right-hand side of Table 4 shows the association between political orientation and intended major. The decline in the proportion of Berkeley freshmen indicating the liberal/left category is in part associated with the increased proportion of students in business and engineering. Among 1984 white male freshmen, business administration is the most popular choice of major. And among those white males choosing business, 44% say they are conservative. (The figure for white females is 20%.) But part of the decline in liberal/left is independent of the shift toward these majors. Students intending majors in the biological sciences and social sciences, and those students undecided about a major, all are less likely to characterize themselves as liberal in 1984 than in 1973.

What Is Meant by "Liberal" and "Conservative"?

Thus, 1973 and 1984 non-minority freshmen apparently differ in three ways that are only partially overlapping: political self-identification, importance of various life goals, and choice of intended major. We know that there are more self-identified conservatives and fewer liberals in 1984 than in 1973. But to return to the issue raised earlier in the paper, how do we know what is meant by "liberal" and "conservative"?

Regardless of the shift in the numbers of students who categorize themselves as liberal or conservative, there are three possible ways the meaning may have changed. First, as has already been suggested, "conservative" in the 80s might not be as "conservative" as in the 60s. That is, attitudes and values may have changed sufficiently so that a person who sees him or herself as "conservative" now may actually espouse beliefs that would have been viewed as "middle-of-the-road" or even "liberal" in the 60s. So a shift toward "conservative" or "middle-of-the-road" as a self-referent may reflect little or no shift in beliefs or attitudes. The second possibility, of course, is just the opposite. There may have been a general erosion of "liberal" attitudes independent of political self-characterization. Thus, the degree of change in the proportion of conservatives and liberals actually would underestimate the degree of the shift toward conservatism.

The third possibility is more complicated. Rather than a simple shift in direction, the actual meaning of the constructs "liberal" and "conservative" may have changed. For example, the strength of association of given issues with political self-identification may have changed dramatically. That is, the issues that clearly divided liberals and conservatives in the 60s may no longer do so, in which case the very distinction may not be as salient or meaningful as it once was. Conversely, previous associations may now be even stronger

or have been replaced by new ones, in which case the distinction between "liberal" or "conservative" may be even more meaningful or very different now.

Thought of in these terms, the question of whether 1984 Berkeley freshmen are really more conservative than 1973 freshmen becomes a tricky one indeed. We explore in admittedly very preliminary fashion a couple of aspects of this issue.

In Table 5 we return to the issue of changes in importance of personal goals and relate these changes to changes in political orientation. For example, we already know that 1984 Berkeley freshmen give greater importance to being very well-off financially than in 1973. This is assumed to be a conservative trend, but how is it actually related to changes in political self-characterization? For example, do more Berkeley freshmen now say that being financially well-off is important because there are simply more conservative freshmen, and conservatives are more likely to endorse this view? As a matter of fact, this appears not to be the case. A conservative political orientation and the importance of financial well-being are moderately correlated. But the increased importance of this financial goal is largely independent of political preference. Similarly, the decline in the importance of a meaningful philosophy of life, more weakly associated with political orientation, seems to have occurred separately from the shift toward self-identified conservatism. Therefore, the two most widely publicized value shifts have, at least for our samples of Berkeley freshmen, very little direct association with the shift in political self-referent.

The next example, the personal importance of raising a family, is just as instructive. Again, as previously noted, both male and female freshmen are much more likely to rate this as important in 1984 than in 1973. The male increase is uniform across the conservative, middle-of-the-road, and liberal

Table 5. Relationship between Selected Personal Goals and Political Preferences for Non-Minority Female and Male Berkeley Freshmen in 1973 and in 1984

% Indicating Personally "Very Important" or "Essential" for Each of the Following:	Sex	Year	Total	Far Right*	Conser-vative	Middle-of-the-Road	Liberal	Far Left*	Gamma**
• Being very well off financially.....	Female	1973	34	-	58	41	27	21	-.35
		1984	58	75	63	66	48	43	-.17
	Male	1973	48	50	69	56	43	21	-.34
		1984	72	100	86	75	61	31	-.36
• Developing a meaningful philosophy of life....	Female	1973	85	-	79	83	86	89	.13
		1984	65	50	58	64	72	43	.14
	Male	1973	77	75	64	69	84	86	.22
		1984	62	50	66	52	71	100	.22
• Raising a family.....	Female	1973	45	-	60	56	37	24	-.35
		1984	64	50	59	66	65	43	.00
	Male	1973	44	50	49	51	41	23	-.19
		1984	68	25	71	67	62	38	-.17
• Becoming accomplished in one of the performing arts.....	Female	1973	37	-	16	27	43	69	.36
		1984	12	0	13	10	14	0	.08
	Male	1973	26	25	17	17	29	57	.28
		1984	14	0	14	5	20	49	.30
• Influencing social values.....	Female	1973	37	-	28	26	43	56	.28
		1984	34	25	23	23	47	86	.35
	Male	1973	30	25	17	21	35	68	.30
		1984	25	50	27	17	29	54	.08
• Keeping up to date with political affairs.....	Female	1973	64	-	55	54	70	81	.24
		1984	68	75	69	55	78	86	.17
	Male	1973	59	63	41	50	67	74	.28
		1984	72	100	79	59	77	43	-.01
• Promoting racial understanding.....	Female	1973				(not asked)			
		1984	49	25	28	42	63	100	.33
	Male	1973				(not asked)			
		1984	38	0	21	31	56	54	.44
Average Number of Respondents:	Female	1973	544	1	41	186	289	27	
		1984	303	4	46	125	121	7	
	Male	1973	825	8	88	260	401	68	
		1984	380	4	112	110	141	13	

*Note small number of cases in these categories, especially for Far Right.

**Gamma is the most commonly used measure of association for data grouped in ordered categories as we have here. In this table, a positive gamma means greater importance of a given goal is associated with a more liberal political preference. Conversely, a negative gamma indicates an association of greater importance with a more conservative preference. A gamma of |.35| is best interpreted as a moderate association.

Source: Cooperative Institutional Research Program, Summary of Data on Entering Freshmen for Fall 1973 and 1984: UC Berkeley

political categories. But, for women, the increase has been greatest in the liberal category, with no change in the conservative category. For our sample of freshmen women, the importance of raising a family does not appear to be the conservative-liberal issue it was in 1973. The importance of becoming accomplished in one of the performing arts shows a similar shift for women. In 1973, 46% of liberal/left women endorsed this goal as an important one; in 1984, liberal freshmen women were no more likely than conservative freshmen women to do so. If this change is as dramatic as it appears to be, the implications may be worth pursuing further.

The next two examples illustrate how, for male freshmen, the liberal/conservative distinction may differ across time. For instance, we have already noted the greater importance attributed to keeping up to date with political affairs in 1984. The analysis in Table 5 clarifies this difference. Whereas the conservative males of 1973 were significantly less likely than liberal males to endorse this personal goal, their 1984 counterparts are just as likely to. The increased political interest of self-identified conservatives may be as or more significant than their increased numbers.

Finally, the personal importance of promoting racial understanding, an item that did not appear on the 1973 survey, has a stronger association with political identification than any other goal for men. It is moderately strong for women as well. We will return to the possible implications of this fact.

Current Views and Political Orientation

The freshman survey also asks for opinions on a range of current issues. Ten such items are worded identically on the 1973 and 1984 questionnaires. Eight of these are shown in Table 6, arranged in order of magnitude of change in the conservative direction. As in Table 5, the strength of the relationship

with political identification in 1973 and 1984 can be compared. Thus, in 1973 a majority of Berkeley freshmen agreed that marijuana should be legalized, and views on this issue were strongly associated with political preference. By 1984, both the level of support for the issue and its association with political orientation had declined dramatically. For several of the items there has been a shift in the "conservative" direction, even within a given political category. But the strength of the association with political orientation has not necesarily declined. Consider, for example, the statement that the wealthy should pay a larger share of taxes. A smaller proportion of freshmen agree with this proposition in 1984 than in 1973, and this holds true for every political category; but the overall association with political orientation remains strong.

By contrast, the last two items, "a college has a right to ban speakers" and "married women's activities are best confined to home", show a different pattern. Here there is a slight shift in the liberal direction and a decline in the association with political orientation. These are two examples, then, of the hypothesis that "conservative" in 1984 is not as conservative as it was in 1973. In fact, in each case the conservative view of 1984 is equivalent to the "middle-of-the-road" position of 1973. In matters of gender and university governance, there may be some support, therefore, for the notion that the increase in the proportion of conservatives exaggerates the actual movement to conservatism. There may be other areas in which this is true as well.

By and large, however, the comparative data we have in Tables 5 and 6 suggests the greater plausibility of the opposite hypothesis. That is, for issues of national policy and personal goals, if anything, conservatives of 1984 appear more conservative--and liberals less liberal--than their freshmen counterparts of 1973. Thus, the erosion of views and values associated with

Table 6. Relationship between Selected Current Views and Political Preferences for Non-Minority Female and Male Berkeley Freshmen in 1973 and in 1984

Statement	Sex	Year	Total	Far Right*	Conservative	Middle-of-the-Road	Liberal	Far Left*	Gamma**
• Marijuana should be legalized.....	Female	1973	71	--	29	43	87	96	.65
		1984	27	0	22	20	36	57	.28
(Percent who agree or strongly agree)	Male	1973	69	75	33	47	85	94	.67
		1984	36	25	26	32	43	77	.23
• Government is not doing enough to protect consumer.....	Female	1973	84	--	71	83	92	97	.37
		1984	51	50	38	43	63	86	.39
(Percent who agree or strongly agree)	Male	1973	75	25	46	66	82	93	.44
		1984	40	25	21	36	56	62	.50
• College grades should be abolished.....	Female	1973	35	--	22	27	39	74	.32
		1984	14	0	9	11	16	29	.25
(Percent who agree or strongly agree)	Male	1973	35	25	16	25	41	68	.38
		1984	12	0	8	5	17	54	.27
• Wealthy should pay a larger share of taxes.....	Female	1973	41	--	29	27	48	85	.40
		1984	27	0	11	21	39	43	.38
(Percent who strongly agree)	Male	1973	44	25	33	32	51	72	.35
		1984	28	0	6	23	47	62	.56
• Government is not doing enough to control pollution.....	Female	1973	60	--	20	43	73	97	.64
		1984	48	25	23	37	66	100	.54
(Percent who strongly agree)	Male	1973	55	13	28	38	62	85	.52
		1984	42	0	16	38	62	85	.61
• Disadvantaged students should have preferential admissions treatment.....	Female	1973	34	--	12	29	37	63	.25
		1984	30	0	17	21	42	72	.39
(Percent who agree or strongly agree)	Male	1973	30	13	14	20	35	53	.36
		1984	27	25	13	27	36	54	.37
• College has right to ban speakers with extreme view.....	Female	1973	66	--	46	45	79	100	-.57
		1984	69	100	55	62	79	86	-.29
(Percent who strongly disagree)	Male	1973	59	38	35	40	71	96	-.58
		1984	65	75	58	60	74	77	-.21
• Married women's activities best confined to home..	Female	1973	85	--	62	75	93	96	-.59
		1984	89	75	83	86	94	100	-.38
(Percent who strongly disagree)	Male	1973	50	14	22	35	60	82	-.52
		1984	61	25	39	60	79	85	-.48

*Note small number of cases in these categories, especially for Far Right.
N's appear on previous table.

**An explanation of gamma appears on previous table.

Source: Cooperative Institutional Research Program, Summary of Data on Entering Freshmen for Fall, 1973 and 1984: UC Berkeley

traditional liberalism may have outpaced the shift in political self-referents, at least according to our preliminary examination of two Berkeley freshmen classes.

We see no evidence of the massive transformation to conservatism among Berkeley freshmen suggested by some media accounts. But we can tentatively conclude that there has been a significant increase in self-identified conservatives, especially among white males. Moreover, there is probably more evidence to support the view that other shifts in values and attitudes not directly accounted for by the shift in political orientation are in a "conservative" rather than "liberal" direction.

Yet, these conclusions should not obscure two equally important ones. First, as has already been stated, Berkeley non-minority freshmen in 1984 remain decidedly more liberal in political identification and social attitudes than national norms. Second, there is no evidence of a dissipation or blurring of the liberal-conservative construct itself. Several items on the 1984 questionnaire (but not available for comparison on the 1973 one) bear this out. The legalization of marijuana may no longer be on the cutting edge of political identification, but issues of military spending and arms control are. In the latter case, just about half of the non-minority freshmen strongly agree that not enough is being done, but note in Table 7 how this half is distributed.

Also used in 1984, but not in 1973, is an item asking students to estimate their chances of participating in student protest. (Ironically, in 1973, but not in 1984, there was an item about colleges being too lax with student protesters. It had a strong association with a conservative political orientation for both men and women.) Exactly half of the 1984 male non-minority freshmen and 53% of the female non-minority freshmen reported that they thought there was at least some chance of participating in protest. The association with political

Table 7. 1984 Berkeley Non-Minority Freshmen Strongly Agreeing that Government Is Not Promoting Disarmament Sufficiently (by Political Preference)

Political Preference	Female	Male
Far Right	0%	0%
Conservative	22%	6%
Middle-of-the-Road	45%	31%
Liberal	82%	75%
Far Left	86%	92%
TOTAL	56%	42%
Gamma	.67	.80

Source: Cooperative Institutional Research Program, Summary of Data on Entering Freshmen, UC Berkeley, 1984.

orientation is fairly strong (gammas of .59 for both men and women). The relatively high priority of working for racial understanding, especially for liberals, might have fostered for some an exercise of that chance in the current anti-apartheid demonstrations.

Conservatism and the Gender Gap

Perhaps the most intriguing area for further inquiry suggested by this preliminary analysis is the apparent increased association of conservatism and gender. Although 1984 Berkeley male and female freshmen are strikingly alike on a number of social and personal views and the relationship of these to political identification, there are some fundamental differences as well. The first obviously is the dramatic difference in the proportion of men and women who identify as conservative. This difference, it should be emphasized, is not simply a function of more men being in traditionally conservative areas of study. Second, the gender gap in certain sociopolitical views is widened because both a higher proportion of males are conservative, and conservative men appear to be more extremely conservative than conservative women. Refer back to Table 7, for example. Third, and most suggestive, political identification for men appears to be more closely associated with attitudes about career and home than for women. (This may be in part a function of the more even distribution of men's political preferences across the three categories of liberal, middle-of-the-road, and conservative, i.e., a statistical artifact. But it is likely more than that.)

Male political orientation is more strongly associated with the following, for example: the prospect of graduates' getting good jobs as a reason for coming to Berkeley, personal chances of finding a job in one's own field, making money as a reason for going to college, the importance of being very well-off

financially (as we have already noted), career choice, and, interestingly, the chances of being married within one year after college. (In the last example, it turns out, 53% of self-identified conservative men expect to be married contrasted with 35% of the conservative women!) Moreover, the positive statistical association that exists between the importance of being very well-off financially and raising a family for freshmen men does not exist for freshmen women.

Previous press releases and media accounts of the Berkeley freshman survey results have stressed the continued convergence of male and female roles. On one level, of course, this is true as the career orientation of Berkeley women has approached that of men. Superficially, at least, liberal male and female freshmen appear to be very similar. However, if we shift our focus slightly, we may be able to discern a significant undercurrent of gender divergence as well.

Conclusion

Because of Berkeley's historically symbolic association with student protest and radicalism, Berkeley students have been fair game for characterization and caricature. As institutional researchers affiliated with Berkeley's Office of Student Research, we are aware of many of the impressionistic generalizations and distortions of Berkeley student characteristics that have been made. We even find ourselves in the awkward position of seeing superficial and misleading interpretations of the annual survey of freshmen, that we ourselves administer, bandied about in the local press.

On the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Free Speech Movement, we decided to pull together some of the information we had that we felt might more accurately characterize the differences between Berkeley students in the 60s and the 80s. There <u>are</u> differences, as we have pointed out. But we have tried to explore them cautiously and less simplistically than the media accounts to which we are exposed.

The events of the last couple of weeks on the Berkeley campus have suddenly reversed the characterizations, and we are responding to new terms: "<u>deja vu</u>," "continuities," and "parallels." Mario Savio reminded students at a noontime rally on Biko (aka Sproul) Plaza that there were traditions at Berkeley that were to be honored. By examining more carefully Berkeley student characteristics of the 60s and 80s, this paper attempts in its own way to honor those traditions as well.

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